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“These cases can be used in all kinds of settings as a spring-
board for discussions about the science and art of how we
work as grant makers. In addition to the explicit learning
obtained from the cases, I see them as a way to encourage
practitioners to exchange knowledge about what they know




“What a wonderful — and comforting — resource this is!
While these cases are about grant making at a major national
institution, I found them relevant to my experience in
community and family foundations. They are full of rich and
accessible lessons for any funder, a model for 
learning from one’s own practice.”
MELINDA MARBLE
Executive Director
The Paul and Phyllis Fireman Foundation
“These cases illuminate many of the key decision-making
challenges that grant makers face in building strong programs.
They’re an excellent resource for all types of foundations.”
KATHLEEN D. McCARTHY
Director
Center for the Study of Philanthropy
The Graduate Center, CUNY
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In short, this is an exercise meant to prompt reflection and
imagination. It may be helpful in framing a group discussion
or as the basis of a training exercise. (In fact, it was origi-
nally written for that purpose.) But it can be just as useful if
read in private. It’s not a test — there are many possible
approaches and solutions to the issues raised here. There are
no “correct” ones unveiled at the end.
If you decide to use this case study with a group or in train-
ing classes, we suggest giving participants plenty of time to
read and think about the case, well before the discussion.
Because the case offers an opportunity for readers to put
themselves in the place of another person, it may take sev-
eral readings, or just some quiet time to think, before a
reader begins to imagine what she or he would do in this
situation. Circulating some open-ended study questions in
advance might help to jump-start a discussion, or highlight
issues of special importance to the members of your group.
We offer some possible questions at the end of this case.
While teaching by case method was made famous by the
Harvard law and business schools, its origins go back to
medical education. Medical students presented with a live
case — say, a person manifesting particular symptoms —
would be asked by their instructors to make a diagnosis and
to recommend a course of treatment. This mode of teaching
continues to dominate pedagogy in clinical medicine.
Meanwhile, case teaching as a pedagogical device has
spread widely in professional education.
So we offer this case in that spirit, as a learning exercise and
a springboard for formulating ideas — but fortunately, with-
out the life-or-death consequences that a medical case
might pose. Several groups have used this case in training
sessions or group discussions at the Ford Foundation, and in
the process they arrived at different conclusions by different
methods. Similarly, we encourage you to think of it not as a
way of learning from someone else’s experience, but as a
way of expanding your own.
Background
Upon his arrival from India in the fall of 1981, grant maker
Robert Armstrong found his fifth-floor office — the first pro-
gram director’s office he would occupy at the Ford
Foundation’s New York headquarters — to be completely
empty. The lack of books, papers, or pending requests for
grant funds was indicative of the blank slate that Armstrong,
age 53, faced as the new director of a new division, called
Rural Poverty and Resources. This was his fourth position in
12 years at the foundation.
The wholesale reorganization of the foundation earlier that
year had resulted in the creation, or at least renaming, of a
number of program units. But the rural program was in many
ways the newest element, an attempt to move into an area
in which the foundation had not previously been directly
involved. With the exception of a fleeting focus on
Appalachian poverty in the early years of the Kennedy
administration, rural American poverty had long been either
ignored or assumed to be in decline. Photographs taken by
Walker Evans and others had captured the rural poverty of
previous eras but had been supplanted in the national imag-
ination by images of the urban poor.
The foundation had planned a modest step to reverse this
trend. Its Rural Poverty and Resources Program in the United
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How to Use This Case Study
The following pages describe a real episode
from the experience of one grant maker at
the Ford Foundation. Except for a few identi-
fying details, the circumstances presented
here actually arose, and the staff member
faced the same questions and choices that
this case study presents to you. But the case
isn’t meant as a history lesson; it doesn’t
supply all of the grant maker’s “answers.”
Those are for you to choose.
States would not only be its newest
program, but also its smallest: The
domestic rural poverty program that
Armstrong would head was to start
making grants in the coming fall,
with at least $500,000 at its dis-
posal.
As he settled into the new office,
Armstrong knew he would have to
do much more than dispose of those
funds. He would have to define the
contours of the program he had
agreed to lead — a program that, he
hoped, would begin to give the issue
of rural poverty a higher profile by year’s end, both within
the foundation and on the public agenda. Doing so would
require a series of key early grant decisions.
The Challenge
Poverty in the United States, whether rural or otherwise, had
never been Robert Armstrong’s field of expertise. Although
an agricultural economist by training, he had come to the
foundation in 1969 from an academic career in economics
and business administration. His previous foundation post-
ings had called on him to apply that background to improve
agricultural productivity, and thereby rural income and
employment prospects, in developing countries in Latin
America and most recently in India. In the latter job, he had
been responsible for agricultural and rural development pro-
grams in the foundation’s largest international office. 
In his new position, Armstrong was to continue to play a role
in the foundation’s international work, serving as an adviser
— “an intellectual resource,” in foundation parlance — gener-
ally to those more junior than he who were making grants in
developing countries. His own grant making, however, was
to focus on rural poverty within the United States. Armstrong
therefore faced not only the challenge of taking on a new
field, but also the need to divide his time between New York
and New Delhi, where he had left-
over obligations that would continue
for another year. Moreover, he
would face his new task mostly on
his own. At the outset, he was to
have only one other program officer
available to help him — someone
who, like Armstrong, had no direct
experience in domestic rural poverty.
Armstrong’s position was challeng-
ing but not overwhelming. He had
considerable experience fashioning
a variety of programs at the founda-
tion, and he no longer considered himself an economist or
agricultural specialist in any narrow sense. Instead, like oth-
ers at the foundation, he thought of himself as a “program-
mer” — someone who could assemble grants and activities
that added up to a coherent, effective philanthropic
endeavor.  Says Armstrong: “Being a programmer, to me,
means that you are not going to pursue an isolated set of
activities, however interesting, but that you are trying to
build something cumulatively and systematically.” 
In that context, Armstrong believed his task in his new posi-
tion was “to put rural poverty on the map, to catch the
attention of people. We were going to have to do something
to make people think that somehow rural poverty and rural
things in general were important.” Armstrong was mindful
that the foundation frequently followed a specific approach
to gaining such a place on the public policy agenda: It often
tried to link grass roots organizing and advocacy groups with
the research capabilities of other institutions, such that the
local groups would be taken more seriously by the policy
mainstream, and might adjust their views based on new
information from research.
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Although he was not to begin his new job formally until
October 1981, Armstrong started thinking about his strategic
possibilities that summer. Armstrong was determined that his
approach not be “too short-term” — that is, not aimed at
quickly funding a series of projects simply to get the program
off the ground. As one of his longtime associates put it: “H e
knew that if all you did was read proposals that came across
your desk and choose from among them, you’d be in trouble.”
As he began to think about the nature of his division, he
took two “givens” as his starting points: the new division’s
name, and the wider spec-
trum of priorities at the foun-
dation. Armstrong believed
that a foundation-wide
emphasis on helping the dis-
advantaged meant that his
job entailed helping the rural
poor improve their own cir-
cumstances, not just finding
ways to promote the develop-
ment of parts of rural
America. And he took the
term “resources” in his pro-
gram title to mean that the
allocation of natural resources
was a factor he should take
seriously in trying to help the
disadvantaged.
Armstrong remembers the summer of 1981 as a flurry of
phone calls. He believed he had to make an attempt to learn
the field in which he’d been asked to work. Yet that was
not, he felt, a task for which he could rely on others. He
believed he had to take a hard and personal look at the
issue of rural poverty. As he recalls:
“I was talking to a lot of people that summer. A lot of
people. I tried to bring myself up-to-date on just what
the sort of thinking is about America during this
period. I talked to people in the agricultural universi -
ties, where I had a background, who were doing
research on rural problems. I was raised in rural
America, so it wasn’t an entirely new subject for me.
But I wanted to find out what the ‘frontier topics’
were, what people were concerned about.
“I wanted to find out about institutional capacities:
Who is doing what? Where are the good minds in
this? I talked to the Department of Agriculture in
Washington. But I wanted to find out about the part of
the equation I knew the least about: the nongovern -
mental, the nonprofit activist
groups around. That’s not a
universe that I had worked
with directly. I was trying to
find out where I was going to
find allies, and who was
really out there that I could
help.”
Armstrong became convinced
that, for the most part, he
faced a policy vacuum. “I
found that it was a very arid
scene, extremely arid,” he
recalls. He did, however, pick
up what he considered to be
some key facts, and he came
to some early decisions.
Armstrong learned that,
although from 1959 unti1 1981 the absolute number of the
rural poor had decreased, the problem of rural poverty could
nonetheless still be cast as significant. The proportion of
those living in poverty in rural areas, he learned, remained
higher than the proportion of the poor in urban areas. He
began to emphasize this “disproportionate rural poverty” in
casual conversations, both outside the foundation and within
it. Armstrong believed that emphasizing such numbers would
help reinforce the fledgling program’s legitimacy — espe-
cially in relation to the foundation’s far larger program in
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‘I wanted to find out
what the frontier
topics were
... and where I was
going to find allies.’
urban poverty. “I did not want to compete with the urban
poverty program,” recalls Armstrong. “But I did want people
to know that rural was important, too.”
His motives were not merely strategic; he shared notes and
insights with others, particularly senior foundation officers.
Promoting the need for his program was, of course, only a
preliminary step before making grant decisions. Having sat-
isfied himself that there was need for a program such as his,
and that the need was not being met, Armstrong set out to
focus his efforts.
Narrowing the Field
Armstrong’s explorations of the “arid scene” in rural policy,
although dispiriting on one level, helped him in another task
he considered crucial: defining what the rural program
would not be. Common reactions to the program’s name
helped him to do so. “If you have ‘resources’ in your title,” he
pointed out, “it’s easy for some people to say, ‘Well, gee, I
guess you work on the Great Lakes, don’t you? Coastal fish-
eries, isn’t that resources?’ We [the foundation] had had a
very strong resource and environment program before.” Yet
Armstrong decided that his was not to be an environmental
program. The process of beginning to exclude topics from his
portfolio-to-be heartened him: “I felt good about it. If you’re
sort of all-inclusive, you don’t have to explain anything to
anybody. But I don’t think you can be effective that way.”
Armstrong believed that to help the rural poor — often iso-
lated, disproportionately unemployed, many working at low-
wage manufacturing jobs, and often earning less than the
poverty level even if employed full-time — it was necessary
to improve their means of earning a livelihood. This belief
would lead Armstrong to a decision to exclude yet another
subject from the rural poverty program’s purview: agricul-
ture.
In many ways, agricultural expertise was Robert Armstrong’s
calling card. He had come of age academically among land-
grant public universities that specialize in improving agricul-
tural productivity. His work overseas had focused on
agricultural development. But during his summer phone-call-
ing, Armstrong had begun to question whether there was
any necessary connection between improving agriculture
and ameliorating rural poverty.
In the fall of 1981, not long after officially assuming his
directorial duties, he had an influential conversation with
Donna Haywood, a foundation consultant who had been a
U.S. Department of Agriculture official in Washington. The
conversation crystallized the doubts Armstrong had about
the part agriculture should play in his program. Haywood
had come to Armstrong to report on some consulting work
she had done for the foundation just prior to his arrival in
New York. As they talked and he reviewed her report, he
realized that she shared his incipient doubts about the cen-
trality of agriculture in an approach to rural poverty. She
described data on the large number of non-farm families
among the rural poor and the relative prosperity of rural farm
counties, in contrast to counties with concentrations of rural
poverty.
Armstrong grew more concerned that aiding agriculture
might not be the most effective approach to aiding the poor.
“It wasn’t a very difficult decision, but it was a major deci-
sion,” he recalls. “We were not going to be working on agri-
culture or price supports or agricultural trade. Those were all
businesses I understood. But we were not going to be a farm
program.”
Having decided some of what he wouldn’t do, in the ensuing
months Armstrong would face a series of decisions that
would begin to define what kind of program he would seek
to run. Seeking to maintain maximum flexibility as he
shaped that program, Armstrong chose not to write an over-
arching program paper but to shape his program through a
series of early grants. He stayed in close touch with senior
foundation officers, and built his program in stages.
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Early Decisions
As a programmer, Robert Armstrong believed that he would
eventually have to build a coherent framework for his grant
making. In the long run, that would likely mean soliciting
proposals for the kind of work he envisioned. But in the
early months of his tenure, he would spend time considering
unsolicited proposals — weighing both their individual merits
and the ways in which they might fit into his long-range
program vision. In his first several months on the job,
Armstrong therefore gave special thought to four potential
grantees: 
1. The Southern Water Project came to Armstrong’s attention
when a Southern state community activist named
Wynonie Edwards arrived at the foundation’s headquar-
ters in New York without an appointment, having paid her
own plane fare. When he agreed to see her, Armstrong
heard an impassioned and effective plea about a subject
he had never thought much about in a U.S. context: clean
drinking water. Many small towns, particularly in the
Southwest but, Edwards believed, in parts of the
Southeast as well, did not have the tax base to build or
maintain safe drinking and waste-treatment systems. In
other communities, residents of poorer neighborhoods
could not afford “hook-up” charges to join municipal water
and water-treatment systems.
Edwards sought $50,000 to begin to develop public/pri-
vate partnerships involving rural church and civic groups
and private businesses, pressing for new drinking water
and waste-treatment initiatives. Funds would pay prima-
rily for staff, not for new water projects directly. Edwards
and her active board of directors seemed energetic and
capable, and the proposal did combine issues of poverty
and natural resources. Moreover, it fit the foundation’s
program interests in other ways, too: The Ford Foundation
was interested in public/private partnerships generally,
and in encouraging women in leadership roles. This effort
would strike three important chords at once.
The Southern Water Project was not a new organization,
however. It was more than ten years old and had already
formed a kind of public/private relationship, inasmuch as
it had been relying on federal and state funds for much of
its work. In fact, Edwards was coming to the foundation
partly because of cutbacks in federal social programs
about to take full effect during the first full fiscal year of
the Reagan administration. Such cutbacks were going to
affect a wide range of programs, and Armstrong knew he
did not have funds to fill the vacuum. In that context,
funding the Southern Water Project might send the wrong
message to other organizations seeking to replace dwin-
dling federal funds.
“In general,” recalls Armstrong, “I was concerned that
people not look on us as able to pick up a good number of
community development groups that had formerly
received major funding. I believed I had to say, ‘Look,
we’re not the replacement.’ ”  Moreover, although
Wynonie Edwards was proposing to reach out to local
business communities in ways that Armstrong was hoping
to encourage, she was nonetheless a loyal veteran of the
War on Poverty, neither accustomed nor predisposed to
such alliances.
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A subject rarely discussed in the United States: 
a lack of clean drinking water




he recalls, “up and run-
ning and well run. It
cared a lot about poor





the quality of water
supplies would not only
have health benefits,
but aid in economic
development as well. “What company,” he asks, “wants to
build a plant somewhere that doesn’t have guaranteed
access to a safe water supply? Safe water is not a suffi-
cient condition for economic development, but [develop-
ment] can’t happen without water.” Finally, the Southern
Water Project was promising to parlay the $50,000 Ford
grant into $500,000 raised from private-sector sources.
2. At nearly the same time that Armstrong was considering
the Southern Water proposal, he found himself faced with
another decision. A nationally known nonprofit public
policy center specializing in rural issues had stood out
amid the “arid scene” that Armstrong had discovered ear-
lier — a rare group that was refreshingly concerned about
rural poverty issues. “The group had to do really with the
range of things I was interested in,” recalls Armstrong.
“Not farmers. I was hopeful, when I first heard about it,
that it could be very helpful.”
The hopefulness was mutual. Leaders of the center hoped
the rural poverty program could, in the long run, provide a
steady stream of support — perhaps at a million-dollar-
plus level, though at that point, almost any level would be
useful to help the center stay afloat. Founded in the early
1970s with a grant from a New York-based foundation,
the center had attracted some attention for the kind of
research that could be influ-
ential in public policy — pre-
cisely the kind of research
that Armstrong knew would
be necessary to capture pub-
lic attention. For example, one
of the center’s studies had
focused on the poor access to
health care among rural resi-
dents who lived far from hos-
pitals. The study had been
especially well received.
Moreover, the center was one
of the very few organizations
whose mission seemed
clearly to overlap with that of the foundation’s Rural
Poverty and Resources Program. Armstrong believed that
his task was in large part “to help invent a field,” to find
ways to develop research capacity in rural poverty topics,
and to bring researchers, advocates, and policymakers
together. A national rural center could be a vehicle for
such work.
At the same time, he was hearing from another major
foundation on the matter. Armstrong knew it was consid-
ered good policy at the Ford Foundation to enlist the
interest and aid of other grant-making institutions. In the
case of the center, there was interest from the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, which had played a key role in starting the
center and wanted to see it continue. In the fund’s view,
recalls Armstrong, “if we didn’t fund this center, we’d
have to invent something else like it.” 
To decide whether to approve the center’s $250,000
request for general support, Armstrong dispatched con-
sultant Donna Haywood and the Rural Poverty program
officer, Carol Johnson, to assess the possibilities. Their
report gave him pause. The center’s leadership, they
found, was not as strong as it might have been. They told
him that the center had been seriously weakened by
budget problems, did not have a reputation for effective-
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‘If we didn’t fund this
center, we'd have to
invent
something like it.’
ness, and did not have a high profile in Washington. It
had been slow in submitting reports, often missing
chances to affect the policy agenda as a result. It was,
moreover, given to making its case in a combative tone
and style left over from a previous political era. Haywood
and Johnson believed that pragmatic assertions, rather
than moral demands, would be necessary in the new
political environment of the 1980s.
Armstrong did not have Washington experience himself
and believed it was important for rural issues to be taken
seriously at the federal level. He therefore took the report
seriously. But he also knew, as an experienced grant
maker, that a major foundation grant can be used to
encourage an organization to rethink its mission, adjust its
operating style, or otherwise reorganize, if there is agree-
ment that such changes are desirable. 
3. In his first six months on the job, Armstrong also began to
receive proposals from institutions that were relatively
certain they would get a sympathetic hearing from him.
One example: the University of Nebraska, Armstrong’s
alma mater and one of the major Midwestern land-grant
institutions known for its work in improving agricultural
productivity. Such institutions usually worked closely with
the more-established farm organizations. Although in
recent years new groups claiming to represent farm inter-
ests had sprung up — for instance, grass roots groups con-
cerned about the increasing purchase of farmland by
insurance companies — the land-grant universities were
far more likely to be close to traditional groups like 
the 4-H.
Armstrong began to get inquiries from a variety of the
land-grant institutions that had previously received foun-
dation support. The proposals stressed the need to help
rural America in adjusting to the farm crisis of the early
1980s — an era that was seeing prices decline sharply
and communities lose population. Some proposals were
focused on specific crop problems, such as wheat blight.
Such issues were not entirely outside Armstrong’s interest,
notwithstanding his decision not to emphasize agriculture
in his grant making. And he knew the land-grant univer-
sities were prestigious research institutions with rural
sociologists and political scientists on staff, not just agri-
cultural experts. If he did not want to fund a proposal on
wheat blight, might he encourage the land-grant univer-
sities to consider work in which he had greater interest?
4. Among those attracted by the use of the word “resources”
in the program division’s title were environmental and
conservation groups, including several that the foundation
had funded in the past. Among those approaching
Armstrong were two prominent environmental groups
known equally for research and advocacy. The primary
interest of both these groups was in Western water,
specifically in preserving the aquatic habitats of various
species.
Armstrong had no immediate interest in such projects, but
he was acutely interested in the broader topic of Western
water. His earlier years in the California university system
had acquainted him with both the problems of water
scarcity and the issue of whether water policy should
favor agriculture over other claims. Armstrong believed
that poverty and water issues were closely related in rural
Western areas in a number of ways. Small, agricultural,
predominantly Hispanic towns in northern New Mexico,
for example, often did not make the best use of the scarce
water supplies they had. Other areas, such as towns on
the Texas/Mexico border, were plagued by unsafe drink-
ing water supplies. Finally, Armstrong believed that resi-
dents of Indian reservations, historically the poorest
places in the West, often lacked access to water, treaty
rights notwithstanding. He felt, too, that there were situa-
tions in which tribes could use or sell their water rights as
part of their economic development strategies, if they had
proper training and representation.
Such work was not what either of these environmental
grant seekers had in mind when they proposed their
Western water projects. Neither had any experience in
dealing with the rural poor or with the particular issues
that had attracted Armstrong’s attention. Still, Armstrong
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considered whether to try to interest these groups in the
kind of Western water project that he, not they, envi-
sioned.
Robert Armstrong would have to keep in mind his overall
program strategy as he considered whether, to what extent,
and in what form he would recommend grant approval for
any or all of these four early applicants.
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Sample Study Questions for This Case:
1. By what processes does Armstrong define his goals
for the Rural Poverty and Resources Program?
2. What are Armstrong’s goals for the Rural Poverty
and Resources Program?
3. Which of the four proposals that Armstrong is con-
sidering should he fund, and why?
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Next Steps in Field-Building
By the end of his first full year as director of the foundation’s
recently created Rural Poverty and Resources division,
Robert Armstrong had recommended grant approvals for
three of the four promising unsolicited proposals he had
received in the early months of his tenure. He provided par-
tial support ($50,000) for the public policy center specializ-
ing in rural issues, targeting funds for it to finish current
projects but not to begin new initiatives. He recommended
an equal amount for the Southern Water Project, which
seemed to him to have the kind of strong community base
which the foundation was seeking to encourage. However,
Armstrong noted in his recommendation that the grant was
not necessarily the precursor to a major pure drinking water
initiative. “I didn't want to do a lot of little things and get
scattered all over the place. But I had a hunch and I wanted
to play it without making a big investment. I put a disclaimer
on it so I didn't get myself out there too far.”
Armstrong's largest grant went to the pair of environmental
groups interested in Western water.  Originally the groups
had submitted a proposal for projects on preserving aquatic
habitats, but, at Armstrong’s urging, agreed to submit a
revised proposal focused on ways in which changes in
Western water management could benefit the rural poor. He
then recommended a one-year grant of $175,000 for each.
In addition, Armstrong made a $100,000 grant to the Council
of State Resource Agencies, a planning arm of the National
Government Executives Association, which planned to work
on interjurisdictional issues affecting water management.
Armstrong liked the water projects because they might be a
way to target funds to some of the poorest geographic areas
in the West and South. Both projects promised economic
development benefits as well. And Armstrong believed that
Wynonie Edwards, the director of the Southern Water
Project, was likely to be a good spokeswoman for the inter-
ests of the rural poor generally. Also, as his consultant Donna
Haywood recalled, “You have to remember that Bob had
worked overseas. He understood irrigation from that experi-
ence, and water issues generally had resonance for him.” 
Armstrong's decision to limit funding for the public policy
center was based not only on his assessment of its condition
at that time but also on his conclusion that its mission
diverged from his own goals. Armstrong was less interested
in early advocacy of specific policy initiatives — the stated
purpose of the center — than in moving the general issue of
rural poverty to a more prominent position on the national
policy agenda. He thought this could be best accomplished
through a strategy of “field-building” — drawing researchers
and organizations to rural issues, introducing them to one
another, and making sure that their work was published and
distributed. Armstrong was aware that, without the center,
he would lose a potential vehicle for drawing public atten-
tion to specific issues. But considering his larger goal to pro-
mote interest — and ultimately policy makers’ interest — in
rural matters generally, he was willing to run that risk.
At the same time, Armstrong continued Haywood's consul-
tancy so that she could serve as liaison to the Western water
projects. Given his own limited staff, Armstrong liked the
idea of having a colleague with whom he could work out his
programmatic agenda. As a consultant, moreover, she could
undertake exploratory or evaluative work with grantees
without being directly responsible for grant recommenda-
tions — thus, she and Armstrong believed, creating a more
informal dialogue. 
As the Rural Poverty and Resources division grew, Haywood
worked to develop a national rural policy research awards
competition, a major part of Armstrong’s field-building
efforts. It was an effort that bore early fruit. To the surprise
of both Armstrong and Haywood, the first round of awards
attracted more than 300 applications — though many were
for farm-related projects that weren’t within Armstrong’s
program focus. At Armstrong’s direction, Haywood also
began to arrange workshops and seminars to help establish
a network of what Armstrong described as “concerned
researchers, policy makers, and rural development and pri-
vate sector leaders.” 
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Such efforts helped Armstrong, over the first three years of
the program's existence, to identify, cultivate, and fund a
group of institutions that began to advance a new rural
agenda. Grantees came from several different rural areas and
many were either community-based or region-based. By its
fifth year, the division’s overall budget would grow to
approximately $6.7 million. And its grant-making staff would
increase from three to four positions, with two program offi-
cers devoted full time to domestic rural poverty issues.
Looking back, Armstrong believed he had been able to
encourage significant progress along several fronts.
Nonetheless, he was frustrated with what he viewed as slow
movement toward his goal of moving rural poverty issues to
center stage. Although pleased with the work of what he
described as “rural action-research groups,” he felt that the
field had not coalesced and that his current approach to
field-building was reaching the limits of its effectiveness.
Wrote Armstrong: “The broader network of more distin-
guished and better-known policy and economics research
institutions typically has shown little, if any, interest in rural
problems.” In particular, he sought a way to “enlist participa-
tion of the major economics and policy studies groups which
have not formerly given priority to U.S. rural concerns.” His
strategy for enlisting such participation would include a new
policy research awards competition. But Armstrong contin-
ued to feel that he needed something more. 
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As he entered his fifth year as the director of the founda-
tion’s Rural Poverty and Resources division, Robert
Armstrong recommended approval of a $165,000 grant to
the Washington-based Institute for Public Studies for the
purpose of serving as the host organization for a new “sus-
tained rural policy program.”
“Staff considered carrying out the expanded program under a
foundation-administered project,” wrote Armstrong, “and
concluded that a preferred option would be to help build a
strong [external] institutional base to sustain the program —
in collaboration with an interested outside organization — if
a suitable candidate could be identified.” The institute he
selected was a prominent, politically neutral organization
known for supporting a wide range of interests, among them
a program on food, water, and climate. The foundation’s
grant would fund a new Rural Economic Policy Program, to
be headed by Donna Haywood. In his recommendation,
Armstrong listed five major purposes for the new program:
1. Defining an agenda of priority research needs in the rural
policy field.
2. Conducting a broad-based campaign to build a national
network of professionals and institutions engaged in pol-
icy studies of the U.S. rural sector.
3. Administering the search and review process to identify
potential candidates for Ford Foundation support under a
rural policy research awards competition.
4. Organizing a series of workshops and seminars to encour-
age interchange on rural policy issues among scholars,
policy makers, rural development leaders, and private sec-
tor decision makers.
5. Fostering the publication of studies of the rural economy
to inform policy makers and to raise awareness among
the general public of problems and issues faced by the
rural sector.
Over the next three years, the institute’s Rural Economic
Policy Program recommended more than 120 grants to the
Ford Foundation, including a number of significant grants to
nationally-known, but Washington-based, institutions
known for analysis of policy and economic trends. In some
cases, such institutions were persuaded to add a rural com-
ponent to their ongoing economic studies.
Among the key grant recipients was the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, known for its analysis of the effects of
changes in federal social welfare spending. The center
received two grants of $150,000 “to research the participa-
tion of the rural poor in federal programs and the impact of
budget questions on the rural poor,” as well as for “ongoing
analysis of rural policy and poverty issues.” Another key
partner identified by the institute was the Children's Defense
Fund, known for its work on urban poverty. It received a
$150,000 grant to “initiate a rural child poverty project.”
Armstrong hoped that such organizations, whose reports
generally commanded the attention of the press and con-
gressional committees, would both build the rural field and
raise the profile of rural issues.
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